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O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 
presented the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with a 
question of first impression.2 That is, whether “aliens who served 
honorably in the U.S. military in times of war [must make] a showing 
of good character when applying to become naturalized citizens.”3 
Unfortunately for these veterans, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly 
interpreted the plain language of the naturalization statutes and held 
that such aliens must show good moral character before becoming 
citizens.4 Particularly troubling is the reasoning by which the court 
                                                 
1 Semper Fi is the motto of the Marine Corps and is short for the Latin phrase 
simper fidelis, which means “always faithful.” http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/HD/ 
Historical/Customes_Traditions/Marine%20Corps_Motto.htm. 
∗ J.D. candidate and Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. Political Science, 2001, University of Arizona.  I am deeply 
indebted to my wife, Stephanie, for all of her support and encouragement throughout 
my time in law school. 
2 453 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006). 
3 Id. at 812. 
4 Id. at 816. 
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reached its conclusion.5 In order to provide aliens with this additional 
hurdle in the naturalization process, the court misquoted a key statute 
and employed a logic riddled with contradiction.6  
Specifically, this Note will contend that the Seventh Circuit erred 
in O’Sullivan when it held that the standard naturalization requirement 
that aliens prove “good moral character”7 also applies to aliens seeking 
to naturalize through statutory exceptions extended to wartime 
veterans.8 The court should have held that, based on a plain reading of 
these statutes, a showing of good moral character is not required for 
wartime veterans to naturalize. Section one of this Note will explain 
the interaction of the naturalization statutes at issue in O’Sullivan. 
Section two will explain why the court correctly declined to defer to 
Citizenship and Immigration Services to interpret these statutes. 
Section three will describe the background and procedural history of 
O’Sullivan. Section four will explain the case law cited by the Seventh 
Circuit in the O’Sullivan decision. Finally, section five will identify 
errors in the court’s analysis.  
 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IMMIGRATION STATUTES APPLICABLE TO 
ALIEN WAR VETERANS SEEKING TO NATURALIZE 
 
Justice Scalia once noted that “administrative law is not for 
sissies.”9 This is particularly true when attempting to elucidate 
consistent meanings from immigration and naturalization statutes, 
which have been described as a “labyrinthine . . . maze of hyper-
technical statutes and regulations that engender . . . confusion for the 
                                                 
5 See id. at 815-16. 
6 Id. at 815 (misquoting 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) by replacing the word “referred” 
with the word “mentioned”). 
7 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006). 
8 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2006). 
9 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 Duke L.J. 511, 511 (Administrative Law Lecture, delivered at Duke University 
School of Law, January 24, 1989). 
2
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Government and petitioners alike.”10 The problem presented in 
O’Sullivan is particularly difficult: “whether [§] 1440 excuses aliens 
who served honorably in the U.S. military in times of war from 
making a showing of good moral character when applying to become 
naturalized citizens.”11 The difficulty in answering this question stems 
from the extensive interplay between 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1427, 1439, and 
1440.12 To limit confusion in this Note, the plain language of these 
statutes is provided in pertinent part below, along with a brief 
overview of how they interact. 
 
A. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) 
 
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427 details the fundamental residency requirements 
necessary to become a naturalized citizen of the United States,13 such 
as the requisite length of time one must be physically present in this 
country and the different types of absences that are permitted during 
this period.14 This statute also includes the good moral character 
component at issue in O’Sullivan.15 Specifically, in relevant part, 
§ 1427 states:  
 
(a) Residence. No person, except as otherwise provided 
in this title, shall be naturalized unless such 
applicant . . . (3) during all the periods referred to in 
                                                 
10 Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *1, n.1, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 
05-2943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005) (citing Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 
2003)), 2005 WL 3738527. 
11 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812. 
12 Boatswain v. Ashcroft, 267 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379 (D.N.Y. 2003) (observing 
that “[w]ading through the statutory scheme is not a simple task because . . . the 
immigration laws are a patchwork, containing numerous inconsistencies and 
vagaries.”) (internal cites omitted).  
13 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 372 F. Supp. 
2d 1097, 1100 (D. Ill. 2005) aff’d, 453 F.3d 809, (stating that “[s]ection 1427(a) sets 
forth the general requirements for naturalization”). 
14 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2006). 
15 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3); O’Sullivan. 453 F.3d at 812-13. 
3
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this subsection has been and still is a person of good 
moral character, attached to the principles of the 
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to 
the good order and happiness of the United States.16 
 
The confusion in O’Sullivan “stems from the good character 
requirement’s placement in the naturalization statute” as a subset of 
the broader residency requirement.17 The reason this placement is 
problematic is because the residency requirements of § 1427(a) are not 
applicable to naturalizing aliens who served in the armed forces during 
times of war.18 Thus, the question in O’Sullivan is whether the good 
moral character requirement in § 1427(a)(3), is waived when the 
broader residency requirements to which it is attached, § 1427(a), are 
waived.19  
 
B. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e) 
 
In its conclusion that alien wartime veterans are required to make 
a showing of good moral character, the court relied, in part, on 8 
U.S.C.S. § 1427(e).20 This section of the naturalization statute allows 
the Attorney General, when considering an applicant’s moral 
character, to consider conduct occurring prior to the five year period21 
                                                 
16 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (emphasis added). 
17 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812. 
18 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a “person filing an 
application under subsection . . . shall comply in all other respects with the 
requirements of this title, except that . . . no period of residence or specified period 
of physical presence within the United States or any State or district of the Service in 
the United States shall be required”). 
19 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 813. 
20 Id. at 815. 
21 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(1) (stating “immediately preceding the date of filing 
his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and 
during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his application has 
been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time and who 
4
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preceding the filing of a naturalization application.22 Specifically, 
§ 1427(e) states: 
  
(e) Determination. In determining whether the applicant 
has sustained the burden of establishing good moral 
character and the other qualifications for citizenship 
specified in subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney 
General shall not be limited to the applicant’s conduct 
during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, 
but may take into consideration as a basis for such 
determination the applicant’s conduct and acts at any 
time prior to that period.23 
 
The O’Sullivan court found it particularly persuasive that this 
section of § 1427 distinguished between “good moral character” and 
“other qualifications for citizenship.”24  
 
C. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b) 
 
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 provides aliens that served in the United States 
military during times of war a short cut to become naturalized.25 This 
short cut is achieved by waiving the standard residency requirements 
detailed in § 1427(a) that are otherwise necessary to naturalize.26 
Specifically, § 1440(b) provides this exception:  
 
                                                                                                                   
has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States 
in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months”). 
22 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e) (LexisNexis 2006). 
23 Id. 
24 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
25 For example, when President George W. Bush issued an executive order that 
declared “the war against terrorists of global reach” an “armed conflict” it was done 
“solely in order to provide expedited naturalization for aliens and noncitizen 
nationals serving in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States.”  
Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 FR 45,287 (July 8, 2002) (emphasis added). 
26 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 813. 
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(b) Exceptions. A person filing an application under 
subsection (a) of this section shall comply in all other 
respects with the requirements of this title, except that--
 . . . (2) no period of residence or specified period of 
physical presence within the United States or any State 
or district of the Service in the United States shall be 
required;27 
 
This exception is unique to wartime veterans;28 another statute govern 
the naturalization of veterans that served during times of peace.29 
 
D. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439 
 
8 U.S.C.S. § 1439 is often viewed as the naturalization statute for 
alien veterans serving in times of peace.30 While it does govern 
veteran peacetime naturalization,31 it also applies to any alien that has 
“served honorably for one year in the military” regardless of whether 
that service was during a time of conflict.32 Thus, “[m]any service 
members will now be eligible [to naturalize] under both [§ 1439] and 
[§ 1440], though their application may only be filed under one 
provision.”33 
                                                 
27 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b) (LexisNexis 2006). 
28 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(a) (requiring that any veteran naturalizing under this 
statute must have served during a “period which the President by Executive order 
shall designate as a period in which Armed Forces of the United States are or were 
engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign 
force”). 
29 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439 (LexisNexis 2006). 
30 See, e.g., O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (stating that § 1439 “sets out the 
naturalization requirements for peacetime veterans”). 
31 This Note will follow the lead of the O’Sullivan court and refer to § 1439 as 
a “peacetime” naturalization statute for the sake of consistency and for the ease of 
the reader. 
32 Major Michael Kent Herring, A Soldier's Road to U.S. Citizenship--Is a 
Conviction a Speed Bump or a Stop Sign?, Army Law., June 2004, at 20, 23. 
33 Id. at n.57. 
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Like § 1440, § 1439 relaxes the naturalization requirements of 
§ 1427 for alien veterans serving in the military.34 This statute, 
however, only lessens the residency requirements; it does not do away 
with them entirely.35 Significantly, § 1439 also includes an explicit 
good moral character provision.36 This provision requires: 
 
(e) Moral character. Any such period or periods of 
service under honorable conditions, and good moral 
character, attachment to the principles of the 
Constitution of the United States, and favorable 
disposition toward the good order and happiness of the 
United States, during such service, shall be proved by 
duly authenticated copies of the records of the 
executive departments having custody of the records of 
such service, and such authenticated copies of records 
shall be accepted in lieu of compliance with the 
provisions of [8 USCS § 1427(a)].37 
 
This requirement has no counterpart in 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440.38  
 
E. 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) 
 
Federal regulations also affect judicial interpretation of these 
naturalization statutes when deference is afforded to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), Citizenship and Immigration 
                                                 
34 Id. at 23-24. 
35 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(d) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that an “applicant shall 
comply with the [residency] requirements of [§1427], if the termination of such 
service has been more than six months preceding the date of filing the application for 
naturalization, except that such service within five years immediately preceding the 
date of filing such application shall be considered as residence and physical presence 
within the United States”). 
36 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e). 
37 Id. 
38 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 contains only three sections: “(a) Requirements”; “(b) 
Exceptions”; and (c) a revocation of citizenship provision. 
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Services (“CIS”), or other administrative agencies.39 “Because 
Congress did not specify the time period during which a qualifying 
noncitizen veteran should demonstrate good moral character, the [INS] 
promulgated a regulation” to answer that question.40 Specifically, that 
regulation states that an applicant: 
 
(d) Has been, for at least one year prior to filing the 
application for naturalization, and continues to be, of 
good moral character, attached to the principles of the 
Constitution of the United States, and favorably 
disposed toward the good order and happiness of the 
United States;41 
 
II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
 
Although the question of whether § 1440 has an implied good 
moral character requirement is an issue of first impression, litigation 
surrounding this requirement is not new.42 But courts often possess a 
mechanism to answer difficult questions of statutory interpretation: 
deference to the administrative agency that is responsible for enforcing 
the naturalization statutes.43 This deference, known as Chevron 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 413, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Lopez v. Henley, 416 F.3d 455, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2005); Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 
189, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
40 Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 104 F.3d 1127, 
1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 
41 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) (LEXIS 2006). 
42 See, e.g., Petitions for Naturalization of F—G-- & E—E—G--, 137 F. Supp. 
782 (D.N.Y. 1956) (denying Petitioners’ naturalization because they could not show 
good moral character as a result of committing adultery during the “five years 
preceding the filing of their petitions.”); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (D. 
Or. 1975) (holding that homosexuality, while not “conform[ing] to the preferences of 
the majority” does not preclude a showing of good moral character). 
43 See I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999) (stating “that 
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the 
immigration context”); but see Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that “[s]ince the Board hasn’t done anything to particularize the meaning of 
8
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deference, becomes available when a court is faced with interpreting 
an ambiguous statute.44 In that instance, a court cannot “simply impose 
its own construction . . . ,” but must inquire as to whether the 
administrating agency has promulgated a relevant interpretation of the 
statute at issue.45 If an administrative interpretation exists, then the 
court must determine if that construction of the statute is reasonable.46 
If it is, then Chevron deference applies and the court can rely upon the 
agency interpretation.47  
There are circumstances, however, when reliance on Chevron 
deference is inappropriate.48 For example, if there are certain 
substantive issues present, such as strong constitutional claims49 or 
because of the procedural context of the case generally.50 In 
O’Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit correctly decided not to defer to CIS, 
because the judicial review of a claim for citizenship must be made de 
                                                                                                                   
‘crime involving moral turpitude,’ giving Chevron deference to its determination of 
that meaning has no practical significance”). 





48 E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914-15 (2006) (explaining that 
“[d]eference in accordance with Chevron, however, is warranted only ‘when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001)). 
49 Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (acknowledging 
“that the canon of constitutional avoidance can trump Chevron”); see Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (holding that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress”). 
50 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a review of a 
denial of citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of 
fact and conclusions of law”). 
9
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novo.51 Because the court could not use Chevron deference to defer to 
CIS’s interpretation of the naturalization statutes, it follows that it is 
improper for the court to rely on case law where such deference was 
given.52 
However, arguably because of a lack of case law on this issue, the 
court did consider cases from other circuits where Chevron deference 
was given to the CIS (or INS) interpretation of the good moral 
character requirement.53 In fact, none of the cases to which the court 
cites addresses whether “§ 1440 entirely excuses qualifying aliens 
from the good moral character requirement” in a way that is on point 
with the present case.54 To its credit, the court does not specifically 
cite to any of these cases when it gives its holding, but it uses them as 
a backdrop to support the new rule it established in the Seventh 
Circuit.55 
 
III. BACKGROUND ON O’SULLIVAN 
 
When he was twelve, Daniel O’Sullivan moved from Jamaica to 
the United States.56 After graduating from high school, O’Sullivan 
                                                 
51 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2006) (relying on 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) that states a review of a 
denial of citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a 
hearing de novo on the application”); see, e.g., Adiemereonwu v. Gonzales, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9681, at *11 (D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that “if CIS denies a 
naturalization application -- and that denial has been confirmed after an 
administrative appeal, consisting of a hearing before a senior naturalization officer -- 
the rejected applicant may seek de novo judicial review of the denial in the United 
States district court for the district in which he resides”). 
52 See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812, n.2 (criticizing Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414 
F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2005) for relying on Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003) 
and “the petitioner’s concession that the statutory interpretation upheld as reasonable 
in Nolan was binding in this new [de novo] context”).  
53 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814-15. 
54 Id. at 812. 
55 Id. at 812-16. 
56 Id. at 810. 
10
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entered active military duty in September 1976 where he “served in 
the Marines and the Air Force during the Vietnam hostilities and was 
honorably discharged from the military in December 1981.”57 After 
leaving the military O’Sullivan “had children, was consistently 
employed, and paid taxes.”58 However, in August, 2000, he was 
convicted of the aggravated felony of being “party to the crime of 
manufacture or delivery of less than five grams of cocaine.”59 After 
serving his sentence in Wisconsin state prison, O’Sullivan “was 
immediately transferred to the custody of the Department of 
Homeland Security which had initiated removal proceedings against 
him while he was incarcerated.”60 In the midst of the removal 
proceedings, O’Sullivan filed a petition to become a naturalized 
citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1440.61 However, his petition was denied 
because of an inability to satisfy the good moral character requirement 
based on his aggravated felony conviction.62 O’Sullivan appealed, but 
was denied by CIS, and subsequently denied by a federal district court 
under the same rationale.63 
Before the Seventh Circuit, O’Sullivan argued that the good moral 
character requirement in § 1427(a) refers only to the specific time 
periods of mandatory residence mentioned in § 1427(a)(1)-(2).64 
Because § 1440(b) removes any obligation to satisfy that residency 
requirement, there is no time period to which the good moral character 
requirement could possibly attach.65 Consequently, O’Sullivan 
                                                 
57 O'Sullivan v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 372 F. Supp. 
2d 1097, 1098 (D. Ill. 2005) 
58 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 810. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 810-11. 
61 Id. at 811. 
62 Id.; see 8 USCS § 1101 (f) (8) (LexisNexis 2006) (barring anyone “who at 
any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony” from making a showing of 
good moral character).  
63 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 811. 
64 Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *2, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 05-
2943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005), 2005 WL 3738527. 
65 Id. 
11
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maintains that under a plain reading of § 1440, aliens that qualify for 
naturalization under this section need not make a showing of good 
moral character.66  
O’Sullivan supported this interpretation by comparing and 
contrasting the two different statutes under which veterans may 
naturalize, § 1439 and § 1440.67 As stated in Section II, § 1439 relaxes 
the naturalization requirements of § 1427 for those veterans of the 
military in times of peace, but nonetheless explicitly includes a good 
moral character requirement.68 A requirement for which there is no 
equivalent in § 1440.69 O'Sullivan urged the court “to find that the 
express mention of a moral character requirement for peacetime 
veterans shows that Congress would have expressly required wartime 
veterans to prove good moral character, if that was Congress's will.”70 
Despite these arguments, on July 6, 2006, a three-judge panel of 
the Seventh Circuit issued a unanimous decision affirming “the district 
court’s denial of O’Sullivan’s petition for naturalization.”71 This panel, 
composed of Chief Judge Flaum, who wrote the opinion, and Judges 
Posner and Kanne,72 held that Congress viewed the good moral 
character and residency requirements separately and thus held that 
even alien war veterans must make a showing of good moral 
character.73 The court gave four reasons for its holding.74 First the 
court found that good moral character was not a subset of the 
residency requirements.75 Second, the court found that the plain 
language of § 1427(a) required a showing of good moral character 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1. 
67 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *4, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 05-2943, 
(7th Cir. August 15, 2005), 2005 WL 3738525. 
68 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e) (LexisNexis 2006). 
69 Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e). 
70  O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814. 
71 Id. at 817. 
72 Id. at 809. 
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“during all periods mentioned” in the statute, regardless of whether the 
actual residency requirements applied.76 Third, the court concluded 
that the good moral character requirement was intended to be separate 
from the residency requirements because it was listed separately in 
§ 1427(e).77 The court also explained that the explicit presence of the 
good moral character provision in § 1439 is the result of unique 
concerns applicable only to naturalizing peacetime veterans.78 
Consequently, such a provision is not necessary in § 1440.79 The 
inquiry into the court’s reasoning will be further developed below in 
Section V.  
 
IV. CASE LAW IN O’SULLIVAN  
 
In O’Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit cites to three “sister circuit” 
decisions that all held a showing of good moral character is required in 
order to naturalize under § 1440.80 However, these cases, from the 
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals respectively, are 
distinguishable from O’Sullivan by either the standard of review or by 
the issue presented.81 These cases are briefly considered below for two 
purposes: first, to survey the landscape of recent litigation involving 
§ 1440 and the good moral character requirement and second, to 
illustrate how any reliance on these cases in O’Sullivan is misguided. 
 
A. The Second Circuit: Nolan v. Holmes 
 
The court first considered a Second Circuit case, Nolan v. 
Holmes.82 There, Nolan was an alien wartime veteran who was 
                                                 
76 Id. (emphasis in original). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 815-16. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 814-15. 
82 Id. at 814 (citing Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003)).   
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convicted of an aggravated felony.83 Once deportation proceedings 
began against him, however, he filed a petition for habeas corpus to 
terminate these removal actions in order to apply to naturalize under 
§ 1440.84 Nolan’s petition was dismissed because the district court 
found that the Board of Immigration Appeals correctly held that he 
was ineligible to naturalize because of an inability to prove good 
moral character.85 Nolan appealed the denial of his petition for habeas 
corpus to the Second Circuit, arguing that § 1440 lacks “any specific 
statement requiring that an applicant . . . demonstrate good moral 
character, or that any particular period of good moral character [be] 
maintained.”86  
Before deciding the issue, the Second Circuit conducted a detailed 
analysis of the statutory language and the legislative history of the 
naturalization statutes.87 In its statutory analysis, the court found 
particularly persuasive the differences between § 1440 and § 1439; 
specifically that § 1439 included an explicit good moral character 
requirement which was absent in § 1440.88 The Nolan court noted that: 
 
In light of the fact that both [§ 1440] and [§ 1439] deal 
with the naturalization of persons who have served in 
the Armed Forces (differentiating between persons who 
served in active-duty status during wartime and those 
who did not) and the fact that the two sections, enacted 
together in 1952, contain some clearly parallel 
provisions, it is difficult to infer that the substantive 
differences between the sections were not intended. 
Thus . . . the appropriateness of interpreting [§ 1440] as 
including [a good moral character] requirement for 
                                                 
83 Nolan, 334 F.3d at 190. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *17, Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, No. 
01-2608, (2d Cir. November 29, 2001), 2001 WL 34316415. 
87 Nolan, 334 F.3d at 195-202. 
88 Id. at 197. 
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naturalization is simply not clear from the face of the 
statute.89 
 
Thus, based on its analysis of the plain language of the statutes the 
Second Circuit found that “the precise interplay between [§ 1427 and 
§ 1440] is hardly clear.”90 
Despite this statutory ambiguity, however, the Nolan court found 
that the legislative history of the naturalization statues supported a 
finding that § 1440 possesses an implied good moral character 
requirement.91 The Second Circuit found particularly relevant a 1968 
Senate Report on the differences between § 1440 and § 1439.92 That 
report described only “three basic differences” between the two 
statutes: 
 
The peacetime serviceman must have a minimum of 3 
years service, the wartime serviceman has no minimum 
required. The peacetime serviceman must petition while 
still in the service or within 6 months after its 
termination, the wartime serviceman has no limitation. 
The peacetime serviceman needs a lawful admission for 
permanent residence, while the wartime serviceman can 
substitute in its stead his induction or enlistment while 
in the United States.93 
 
Notably lacking in this identification of differences is any mention of 
the good moral character requirement.94  
 Because of the ambiguity of the naturalization statutes, the 
Second Circuit, through the use of Chevron deference, was able to 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 198-201. 
92 Id. at 200-01. 
93 S. REP. No. 90-1292, at 4519-20 (1968) (cited by Nolan, 334 F.3d at 201). 
94 Nolan, 334 F.3d at 200-01. 
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defer to the INS interpretation of § 1440.95 And the INS interpretation 
of § 1440 is that alien war veterans are required to show good moral 
character.96 Thus, Nolan was required to show good moral character in 
order to naturalize.97 However, because the Nolan court deferred to the 
INS in reaching its holding, it is improper for the O’Sullivan court to 
rely upon Nolan when the issue before it must be reviewed de novo.98 
 
B. The Fifth Circuit: Lopez v. Henley 
 
A second case to which the Seventh Circuit cited was Lopez v. 
Henley, a Fifth Circuit case that, like Nolan v. Holmes, utilized 
Chevron deference.99 Also similar to Nolan, the issue before the Fifth 
Circuit arose as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to appeal a 
deportation order.100 In a short opinion, the Fifth Circuit found the 
statutes ambiguous and relied on Nolan to find the INS interpretation 
reasonable.101 Specifically, the Lopez court cited a long passage from 
Nolan and agreed that: 
 
Notwithstanding Congress's desire to reward aliens who 
have served the United States in its Armed Forces, it 
hardly seems unreasonable for the INS to have inferred 
                                                 
95 Id. at 198. 
96 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) (LexisNexis 2006). 
97 Nolan, 334 F.3d at 195. 
98 The procedural posture in O’Sullivan precludes the use of Chevron 
deference. O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2006); compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (permitting a court to defer to an 
administrative agency when a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is 
reasonable), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) (stating that a review of a denial of 
citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and 
conclusions of law”). 
99 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814 (citing Lopez v. Henley, 416 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 
2005)). 
100 Lopez, 416 F.3d 456. 
101 Id. at 457-58. 
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that Congress would not have intended to single out 
persons trained and/or experienced in physical 
confrontations for elimination of the requirement of 
good moral character.102  
 
Because of Chevron deference to the INS, the Fifth Circuit 
required a showing of good moral character by aliens seeking to 
naturalize under § 1440.103 Accordingly, because of the exercise of 
Chevron deference, and just as in Nolan, any reliance by the Seventh 
Circuit on Lopez is improper.104  
 
C. The Ninth Circuit: Santamaria-Ames v. INS 
 
The only case that the O’Sullivan court cited to that did not rely 
on Chevron deference was Santamaria-Ames v. INS.105 Procedurally, 
Santamaria-Ames is remarkably similar to O’Sullivan.106 Santamaria-
Ames was born in Peru and entered into the United States Army in 
1974.107 However, after three Article 15 violations and fifteen 
counseling sessions for disciplinary violations in his first nine months 
of active duty, Santamaria-Ames was honorably discharged from the 
Army due to unsuitability.108 His civilian life was similarly 
unsuccessful.109 By 1989, Santamaria-Ames had accumulated “twenty 
arrests, five felony convictions and twelve misdemeanor 
convictions.”110 In 1981 deportation proceedings began against him, 
                                                 
102 Id. at 458; Nolan, 334 F.3d at 198. 
103 Lopez, 416 F.3d at 458. 
104 See supra note 98. 
105 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Serv., 104 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
106 Both cases arose from a denied naturalization petition.  See O’Sullivan, 453 
F.3d at 811; Santamaria-Ames, 104 F.3d at 1130. 
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but, after a series of rejected appeals for a waiver of deportability, 
Santamaria-Ames filed to become a naturalized citizen in 1992.111  
However, before the Ninth Circuit, Santamaria-Ames did not 
claim that alien war veterans were exempt from showing good moral 
character.112 Instead, he argued that the “INS is precluded from 
examining character issues predating the . . . one year period” before 
his naturalization application to determine if he meets the “good moral 
character” requirement.113 The Ninth Circuit concluded that conduct 
occurring previous to the one year period before filing could be 
considered in the naturalization application and the denial of 
Santamaria-Ames’ application for citizenship was upheld.114  
Santamaria-Ames does not elucidate any answers for the Seventh 
Circuit. These two cases are distinguishable because Santamaria-Ames 
essentially conceded the primary assertion at issue in O’Sullivan.115 
Thus, it would be disingenuous for the O’Sullivan court to take an 
unchallenged assumption from Santamaria-Ames (i.e. that alien war 
veterans must show good moral character in order to naturalize) and 
use it as precedent to support a holding where that assumption is being 
challenged. 
 
V. ERRORS IN THE O’SULLIVAN ANALYSIS 
 
It is not clear how much the Seventh Circuit actually relied upon 
the circuit cases it cited in O’Sullivan.116 Ultimately, however, the 
                                                 
111 Id. at 1130. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1131. 
115 Id. at 1130; O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 
453 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that Santamaria-Ames “did not 
claim, as O’Sullivan does, that the good moral character requirement is waived for 
wartime veterans”).  
116 While the court announces its holding with the introduction, “[l]ike our 
sister circuits,” it declined to cite to the cases it previously mentioned in any of its 
actual analysis. O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
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court seemed to base its holding on four arguments.117 First, that good 
moral character is not a subset of the residency requirements.118 
Second, the court found that the language of § 1427(a) requires that, in 
order to become a naturalized citizen, alien wartime veterans must 
show they are of good moral character “during all periods mentioned 
in the subsection” including the present.119 Third, the court found that 
§ 1427(e) indicated that Congress viewed residency requirements 
different from the “good moral character” requirements, because they 
were listed separately in that statute.120 Finally, the court explained 
that “[a]lthough § 1439 explicitly discusses good moral character, it 
does so only in contexts that are relevant only to peacetime 
veterans.”121 Therefore the absence of this phrase in § 1440 could not 
support the inference that good moral character does not need to be 
shown by the wartime alien veteran.122 
 
A. First Argument: Good Moral Character is not a Subset of the 
Residency Requirement 
 
The Seventh Circuit first supports its holding that aliens who 
naturalize under § 1440 are required to show good moral character by 
declining to “interpret the good moral character requirement as a 
subset of the residency requirement.”123 Unfortunately, little further 
analysis accompanies this declaration.124 The court merely adds that 
the good moral character requirement does not disappear simply 
“because it is found in a subsection with the heading ‘residence.’”125 
                                                 
117 Id. at 815-16. 
118 Id. at 815. 
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This explanation is not only counterintuitive, but contrary to 
established principles of statutory interpretation: a subset is not 
independent of the larger section in which it rests.126  
 Principles of statutory construction do allow a statute’s structure 
to inform its text,127 but the Seventh Circuit redefined the structure of 
§ 1427(a) in order to change the meaning of the text by holding that 
§ 1427(a)(3) is not a subset of § 1427.128 This redefinition transforms 
the good moral character requirement from being the third prong of a 
three element test129 to an independent test in § 1440 
naturalizations.130 However, this transformation runs contrary to the 
“law of statutory construction that, absent ambiguity or irrational 
result, the literal language of the statute controls.”131 Section 1427(a) 
is not confusing or ambiguous: it is a subsection132 entitled “residence” 
and under which Congress placed three subsets,133 one of which is the 
                                                 
126 C.f. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 401 (1992) (White, Blackmun, 
O’Conner, JJ, concurring) (“It is inconsistent to hold that the government may 
proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, but 
that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently without 
violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless 
and undeserving of constitutional protection.”)  
127 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 
(2005) (stating that because “[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction 
apply….we must examine the statute’s text in light of context, structure, and related 
statutory provisions); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 553 (2002) (interpreting 
a criminal statute based upon its structure). 
128 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
129 NORMAN J. SINGER, SOUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, vol. 1A, 
§ 21.14, 179, (West Group, 2002) (stating that where “it is the legislative intent that 
all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the 
conjunctive ‘and’ should be used”). 
130 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
131 Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986). 
132 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (LexisNexis 2006) is a subsection of 8 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1427. See Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/subsection 
(defining a subsection as “a subdivision or a subordinate division of a section”).   
133 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) is a subset of 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a). See Miram-
Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/subset (defining a subset as “a set 
each of whose elements is an element of an inclusive set”). 
20
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good moral character requirement.134 In the face of plain language, it 
is simply not in the power of the court to emasculate Congressional 
legislation by redefining statutory structure.135 
 
B. Second Argument: Good Moral Character Must be Shown 
“during all periods mentioned in the subsection” 
 
Second, the court concludes that § 1427(a) requires that the good 
moral character requirement must be shown “during all periods 
mentioned in the subsection.”136 The court finds it noteworthy that this 
language was selected by Congress as opposed to language that would 
mandate a showing of good moral character “during the period of time 
an alien is required to have lived in the United States before 
naturalizing.”137 From this, the court insists that because the five year 
period is still “mentioned” in § 1427(a) than “good moral character” 
must be shown even though there is no residency requirement to 
which it can attach.138 Additionally, the court finds that § 1427(a) 
requires an alien to “show that he is still of good moral character” – a 
requirement that is not conditioned upon residence.139 
First, the court misquotes § 1427(a)(3) as stating that good moral 
character must be shown “during all periods mentioned in the 
subsection.”140 Rather § 1427(a)(3) properly states that “during all the 
periods referred to in this subsection [the alien] has been and still is a 
                                                 
134 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427. 
135 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (explaining 
that when “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms’”) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
485 (1917)). 
136 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 815 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 USCS § 1427(a)) (emphasis in original). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
140 Compare O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815, with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
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person of good moral character.”141 This is a meaningful and 
significant difference. The word “mention” is defined as “citing or 
calling attention to someone or something especially in a casual or 
incidental manner.”142 Consequently, under the word “mentioned,” no 
connection is necessary between good moral character and residency 
in order to make the good moral character element applicable.143 The 
court’s misquotation creates the false impression that § 1427(a)(1) and 
(2) are not intended to interact with § 1427(a)(3); but the tenuous 
relationship between these elements is something the court’s analysis 
creates, and then exploits.144  
Thus, the Seventh Circuit is essentially presenting a strawman 
argument, because under the word “referred,” a relationship between 
good moral character and residency is established.145 The word “refer” 
is defined as “to have relation or connection” or “to direct attention 
usually by clear and specific mention.”146 By using “referred” instead 
of “mentioned,” Congress is specifically limiting the application of the 
good moral character requirement to that time period indicated by the 
residency requirements.147  
This interpretation is not only substantiated by the plain language 
of the statute, but also by the structure of § 1427(a).148 As stated 
above, the good moral character requirement is, in fact, a subset of a 
subsection titled “residence.”149 Therefore, it is logical to conclude 
                                                 
141 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).  
142 See Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/mention 
(emphasis supplied). 
143 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
144 Id. 
145 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).   
146 Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/refer (emphasis 
supplied). 
147 Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that courts 
should “presume that legislatures and agencies mean what they say . . . the ‘plain 
language’ of a statute or regulation will be the best indicator of the enacting body’s 
will”). 
148 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a). 
149 See supra note 134. 
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that good moral character has a relationship to residency.150 Moreover, 
the nature of this relationship conditions the relevancy of § 1427(a)(3) 
on the existence of § 1427(a)(1) and (2)151 such that if the residency 
requirements represent a time frame of zero152 then there is no time 
period to which the good moral character requirement can refer.153  
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the “still is” portion 
of § 1427(a)(3) requires aliens to show good moral character 
regardless of whether the preceding residency requirements apply154 
inherently presumes that Congress is grammatically incompetent. As 
the Second Circuit acknowledged, albeit inconclusively, in Nolan, 
“linguistic purists could argue that the precise phrase used in 
[§ 1427(a)] -- ‘still is . . . of good moral character’ -- connotes 
continuity, which logically cannot be shown if there is no relevant 
prior period.”155 Congress could have simply switched the word 
“still”156 with “presently” and in that manner clearly communicated 
that the good moral character requirement is not limited to the periods 
of residency expressed in § 1427(a)(1)-(2). However, Congress chose 
to use “still.”157 Accordingly, the plain language of § 1427(a)(3) has a 
specific meaning that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, ties good moral 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (stating that a naturalizing alien must show good 
moral character “during all the periods referred to in this subsection”). 
152 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006). 
153 Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *2, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 
05-2943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005), 2005 WL 3738527 (questioning “how a good 
moral character requirement that is explicitly tied to a period can still exist when the 
period requirement is taken away”); see Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 197 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (recognizing the possibility that § 1440 “was not intended to compel any 
showing [of good moral character] that another INA section requires in connection 
with a period of residence”). 
154 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 815 (7th Cir. 2006). 
155 Nolan, 334 F.3d at 197. 
156 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/still 
(follow “still[3adverb]”) (defining still as “a function word to indicate the 
continuance of an action or condition”). 
157 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).  
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character to the residency requirements.158 Therefore, if the alien 
naturalizing under § 1440 is exempted from both of the residency 
requirements in § 1427 then there is nothing to which the good moral 
character requirement can refer, including the continuous, “still is,” 
requirement of § 1427(a)(3).159 
 
C. Third Argument: § 1427(e) Reveals Congress Views Good Moral 
Character and Residency as Distinct Requirements 
 
The court’s third argument is that because § 1427(e) separates the 
good moral character requirement from “other qualifications for 
citizenship,”160 including the residency requirements, this indicates 
that Congress “viewed the two requirements as distinct.”161 However, 
the Seventh Circuit neglects to explain the implication of this 
distinction.162 While there is no doubt that residency requirements are 
different from a requirement to show good moral character,163 the 
question in O’Sullivan is how these two different requirements are 
intended to interact with each other.164  
Unfortunately, § 1427(e) is unable to answer this question because 
it relates to a different matter entirely.165 This subsection of § 1427 is 
                                                 
158 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a); O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
159 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b) (LexisNexis 2006); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427. 
160 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e). 
161 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (listing good moral character and residence 
as two separate requirements). 
164 Compare Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *7, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 
05-2943, (7th Cir. August 15, 2005), 2005 WL 3738525 (arguing that “a showing of 
good moral character need only be made for required periods of residency”), with 
Response of Respondent-Appellee, at *10, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 05-2943, 
(7th Cir. October 14, 2005), 2005 WL 3738526 (acknowledging that in § 1440 
“Congress clearly recognized . . . that some of the general requirements, such as 
residency, may be waived[, b]ut there is no indication from the text of the statutes 
that Congress intended to waive a requirement of good moral character for 
naturalization purposes”). 
165 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e). 
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solely concerned with the ability of the Attorney General to take into 
consideration issues of good moral character and residence beyond the 
scope of the five year period given in § 1427(a)(1).166 Thus, while 
§ 1427(e) identifies good moral character and residence as separate 
requirements, such a distinction sheds no light upon the way these two 
requirements interact in § 1427(a).167  
 
D. Fourth Argument: Distinguishing Between § 1439 and § 1440 
 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit erred when it neglected to appreciate 
the significance of the presence of the good moral character 
requirement in § 1439 and the absence of this or similar requirement in 
§ 1440.168 Instead of taking this plain difference at its face, the 
O’Sullivan court relegated this crucial dissimilarity in the statutes to a 
difference in the time frames under which veterans may naturalize.169 
According to the court, the purpose for explicitly mentioning the good 
moral character requirement in the context of § 1439 is to allow 
peacetime veterans to utilize their military records to meet the 
requirements of § 1427(a).170 The court explains this is necessary 
because aliens naturalizing under § 1439 must do so no later than six 
months after being honorably discharged and therefore may need to 
                                                 
166 See Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 104 F.3d 
1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the pertinent inquiry is whether the 
petitioner is presently of good moral character and has demonstrated good moral 
character [during the statutory period] . . . [but] [c]riminal conduct and other 
behavior prior to [this] period may be examined”); Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d 
491, 495 (9th Cir. 1950) (holding that the statutory five year period is the only 
material determiner of good moral character, but prior periods are “circumstantially 
relevant as bearing upon petitioner’s character”). 
167 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a). 
168 O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 
809, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440. 
169 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that “[u]nlike wartime veterans, 
peacetime veterans must serve in the military one full year and apply within six 
months of discharge, or while still serving in the military”); compare 8 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1439(a), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(a). 
170 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815. 
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rely upon military records to establish good moral character.171 The 
court elaborated, that it was not necessary for Congress to include a 
similar provision in § 1440, because wartime veterans often have 
shorter lengths of service and may apply for naturalization long after 
their service has ended.172 Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit, 
“military records could be significantly less helpful in determining 
their current moral character. It stands to reason, then, that Congress 
would not set hard-and-fast rules on the use of military records as a 
means for wartime aliens to prove good moral character.”173  
The court’s explanation does not adequately explain this 
discrepancy between § 1439 and § 1440 for three reasons. First, while 
alien wartime veterans may choose to naturalize long after they leave 
military service as the Seventh Circuit suggests,174 they need not do 
so.175 In the event that a wartime veteran opted to naturalize 
immediately after being discharged or while still in military service, 
O’Sullivan requires that soldier to prove good moral character.176 In 
such circumstances, the alien wartime veteran has same reliance on 
military records to prove good moral character as an alien serving in a 
time of peace and naturalizing under § 1439.177 Because the reliance 
on recent military records is the same in both scenarios, the Seventh 
Circuit’s justification of the presence of the good moral character 
provision in § 1439 suggests that Congress should have included a 
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 815-16. 
174 Id. 
175 Alien wartime veterans can apply to naturalize during their military service. 
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(c) (stating that the successful naturalization of a soldier can 
be revoked if they are “separated from the service under other than honorable 
conditions”). 
176 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 816 (holding that aliens naturalizing under § 1440 
must satisfy the good moral character provision in § 1427(a)). 
177 Cf. O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that peacetime veterans need 
the good moral character provision of § 1439(e) in order to prove good moral 
character through recent military records). 
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similar provision in § 1440.178 Just like aliens who naturalize under 
§ 1439, alien wartime veterans naturalizing under § 1440 need a good 
moral character provision that allows them to “show good moral 
character during their recent service through military records.”179 Yet 
no similar, or any, good moral character provision exists in § 1440.180 
Thus, there are two explanations as to why § 1439 has a good moral 
character provision and § 1440 does not, either Congress overlooked 
the possibility that veterans naturalizing under § 1440 might do so 
immediately or else the court’s analysis on this provision was 
incomplete.181 
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis also fails to consider the 
relevancy of § 1427(e) on the differences between § 1439 and 
§ 1440.182 Section 1427(e) provides that the Attorney General “may 
take into consideration as a basis for [determining good moral 
character] the applicant’s conduct and acts at any time prior to that 
period.183 Accordingly, if an alien naturalizing under § 1440 is subject 
to the good moral character requirement in § 1427, then the Attorney 
General may find old military records of significant interest to reach a 
conclusion concerning an applicant’s good moral character.184 Yet 
there is no provision in § 1440 that provides for the use of old military 
records to prove good moral character, despite the inclusion of such a 
provision in § 1439.185 
Finally, nowhere on this issue does the Seventh Circuit in 
O’Sullivan cite to an applicable and extensive legislative record.186 
                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006). 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 174-80. 
182 O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815-16. 
183 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e). 
184 But see O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that aliens naturalizing 
under § 1440 may be far removed from their military service so that their “military 
records could be significantly less helpful in determining their current moral 
character”) (emphasis supplied). 
185 Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e) (LexisNexis 2006), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440. 
186 See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812-16. 
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Unfortunately, however, the lack of citation did not prevent the court 
from asserting what are essentially Congressional intent arguments.187 
Such analysis is particularly troubling when the court is attempting to 
explain and rationalize why one statute contains a clause that a 
functionally similar statute does not; especially when both statutes 
were “enacted together . . . [and] contain some clearly parallel 
provisions.”188 The Supreme Court has made this pillar of statutory 
interpretation clear: “[w]e do not lightly assume that Congress has 
omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends 
to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown 
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a 
requirement manifest.”189 This canon of statutory construction is 
particularly relevant in O’Sullivan, because of the Seventh Circuit’s 
choice to rely solely on the plain language of the statutes to support its 
reasoning.190 
This critique of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is further 
strengthened by legislation that occurred after the O’Sullivan opinion 
was issued.191 Just less than three months after the Seventh Circuit 
decided O’Sullivan, a bill was proposed in the Senate that would add a 
good moral character requirement to § 1440.192 Entitled the “Soldiers 
to Citizens Act,” this bill would amend § 1440 to require an alien 
wartime veteran to “demonstrate to the military chain of 
command . . . good moral character.”193 This proposal by former 
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, serves as an additional indicator that 
                                                 
187 Id. at 815-16 (explaining the reasons why Congress mentions good moral 
character in § 1439 but not in § 1440). 
188 Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003). 
189 Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005). 
190 See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812-16. 
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the plain language of § 1440 does not currently require naturalizing 




The O’Sullivan court erred in its holding that alien wartime 
veterans need to show good moral character in order to naturalize 
under § 1440. The Seventh Circuit not only failed to properly interpret 
the plain language of the naturalization statutes, including adequately 
explaining why § 1439 included a good moral character provision but 
§ 1440 did not, but it also misquoted a relevant part of § 1440 and then 
relied upon that misquotation to reach its conclusion. Finally, the court 
did not cite to any legislative history, though it presumed to infer 
Congressional intent to support an opinion that ran contrary to the 
plain language of the relevant statutes. Whether based on policy 
preferences or simply out of a desire not to be the first circuit to break 
rank on this issue, the O’Sullivan court erred in interpreting § 1427 
and § 1440 to require a showing of good moral character from alien 
wartime veterans.  
While this ruling impacts a great many alien veterans serving in 
the armed forces, the effect of this impact is likely to be slight. If 
legislation passes that adds an explicit good moral requirement to 
§ 1440 then O’Sullivan will not present any adverse consequences to 
veterans seeking to naturalize under § 1440. However, until such 
legislation passes, it is possible that O’Sullivan will discourage aliens 
from serving in the military, because misconstruing the plain language 
of § 1440 undermines the certainty and possibility of naturalization. 
                                                 
194 Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006), with S. 3947, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
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